Monday, Oct. 26, 2009

India's War at Home

By Jyoti Thottam / Srinagar

Abid Baig is a salesman in a dried-fruits shop in Lal Chowk, the central shopping district of Srinagar, Indian Kashmir's capital. But Baig's real calling is as a stone thrower. A familiar figure at protests forazadi, or freedom, that regularly clog Srinagar's streets, 21-year-old Baig is angry, blaming the pervasive Indian security presence for choking off his chance at a decent life. His parents pulled him out of school when he was just in 10th grade because they worried that their only child would be picked up by police trolling for militants. Baig speaks intensely and deliberately, looking down at his hands, so an arc of black hair droops over his forehead. "Everybody wants to be something," he says. "I wanted to be a doctor." Instead, he hurls stones to vent his frustration. "They don't allow us to live in peace."

Peace in Kashmir — as in Afghanistan, Iraq and much of the Middle East — has long seemed out of reach, but it is just as urgent. India and Pakistan have fought three wars over the territory since 1947, when Muslim-majority Kashmir acceded to mostly Hindu India, over Pakistan's objections. Kashmir is much more than an unresolved border dispute, however. To Pakistan, it is an endless grudge against an old enemy that seems to supersede even its own war against the Taliban. To India, Kashmir is the most potent reminder of the violence it has been unable to escape while aspiring to a more prosperous future. (Read "A Violent Crime Resurrects Kashmir's Call for Freedom.")

The two countries negotiated a Line of Control dividing Indian and Pakistani Kashmir in 1971, but that unofficial border has been a source of constant conflict and tension. In 1989, a homegrown movement of Kashmiri separatists rose up against India; Islamabad supported some of them, as well as groups of cross-border militants. To put down this multiheaded insurgency, New Delhi sent in what amounts now to a presence of 700,000 troops (among a civilian population of just 5 million). The military's hard-line tactics have sparked considerable anger among the local populace. The presence of those troops — despite the decline of the separatist movement — is the core complaint for ordinary Kashmiris like Baig. India ignores the rage of these young men at its peril. Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, head of Srinagar's central mosque and chairman of the moderate faction of the Hurriyat group of separatists, warned in a recent speech that if the concerns of the Kashmiri people are not heard, "the mind-set of those individuals, particularly youth, will likely deteriorate into a continuous feeling of occupation and endangerment, leading them to pick up arms again."

Baig and his friends are the new icons of Kashmiri hostility toward the Indian state. The stone throwers are often photographed in action, yet little is known about them. On a recent afternoon, however, I actually met several. There was Amir, a reedy 17-year-old who sneaks out to the protests without telling his parents; Asif, a muscular 24-year-old rickshaw driver; and Muddasar, 20, with soft blue eyes and a dark red bullet wound in his left shin. Their de facto leader is Imran Zargar, 24, who spent 11/2 years in jail after one ugly clash. His police record then disqualified him from any job with the government, by far Kashmir's largest employer. Says Zargar: "I found that I had no future."

Will such disillusionment evolve into a more serious threat against the Indian state? In their jeans and Nikes, the resentful young men of Srinagar identify most closely with youths on the streets of Gaza and the West Bank, not those in jihadist training camps. But they also insist that religious heads support what they do, and that if they die in a protest, they will be considered martyrs. A military intelligence official in New Delhi who has served in Kashmir worries, "Many young Kashmiris have taken arms and embraced radical Islam because there is no hope of a good life."

Indian forces in Kashmir have traditionally been more focused on jihadists based in Pakistan, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the group that Indian and U.S. authorities blame for last November's terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Indian officials say that Pakistan has not only failed to prosecute any top LeT leaders, it has continued to support their incursions into Indian Kashmir. They hold up as evidence several recent incidents, including a Sept. 12 car bomb set off next to a police bus in Srinagar. "Two Lashkar commanders masterminded the attack," claims Farooq Ahmed, inspector general of police for Kashmir. Ahmed says that one of them, Abdur Rehman, "is hiding somewhere in south Kashmir."

In this climate, resolving Kashmir may seem to have little chance, yet diplomacy has picked up a bit of pace. Over the past few months, there have been signs of a thaw and hints that the two countries, prodded by Washington, would reopen a dialogue that has been stalled since the Mumbai terror attacks last year. On June 16, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari shook hands at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Russia, where Zardari acknowledged that Pakistan's greatest threat was the Taliban — a remarkable admission for a country that has long considered India its most dangerous neighbor. Indian authorities, meanwhile, may soon start talks with the Hurriyat separatists. But every gesture of reconciliation — most recently, meetings between top diplomats on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York City — has been followed by tough talk and accusations from both sides.

A Spreading Rage
The formative event for Kashmir's angry youth was the August 2008 protests over Amarnath, a Hindu shrine about 88 miles (141 km) from Srinagar. A massive movement opposed the Kashmir state government's controversial decision to allocate 100 acres (40 hectares) of land to a local Hindu pilgrimage group, and drew as many as 500,000 protesters on one day. The police fired on the crowds (Muddasar, the young stone thrower, was among those injured) and as many as 20 people were killed in the most intense week of protests. For Basharat, just 14, Amarnath was his initiation. I asked him what he felt the first time he threw a stone. "Anger," he says. But throwing wasn't enough. "It has to hit its target."

See pictures of Kashmir residents at the polls.

Read about the 2008 clashes.

The Amarnath controversy alone is not behind the resurgence of local protests against New Delhi — although most of the protest leaders are closely linked with separatists. The more lasting effect has been a pervasive sense of cynicism. The Amarnath killings have been added to a long list of grievances against the Indian security forces, who pretty much run Srinagar on their own — they have wide powers to shoot, arrest and search without fear of repercussions — while Indian and Pakistani politicians and bureaucrats ponder their next moves. The recent rape and murder of two young girls in the town of Shopian, allegedly by Indian soldiers, is the latest outrage. Bashir Dabla, a professor of sociology at Kashmir University who has studied the social impact of the 20-year conflict, says that young people feel abandoned as the issue drags on: "This has given the impression among Kashmiri youth that both these countries are just following their own interests."

That sentiment extends well beyond the young and disaffected. Meraj Gulzar, 36, is the owner of a small information-technology-services firm, one of about 40 companies employing 2,000 people in Srinagar's tiny IT industry. Gulzar wants to bring Srinagar a piece of the economic boom that has transformed so many other Indian cities. "We would like to be as successful as Bangalore, Pune or Delhi," he says. Kashmir has a big advantage — a large population of well-educated but unemployed college graduates whose salaries are far below those in India's established IT hubs. But the state government and the army are virtually Gulzar's only clients; multinational companies are reluctant to outsource work to Kashmir. "Unless and until there is a political solution," he says, "it won't happen."(Read "Big Turnout, Amid Protests, in Kashmir Vote.")

There's also the psychological impact of living under constant stress, worrying about whether family members will be stopped by security forces. For a visitor to Kashmir, the number of checkpoints and bunkers, all manned by soldiers carrying AK-47s and sometimes just feet apart, is hard to ignore. But more unsettling are the curfews, called during major protests, elections or any time authorities see fit. They are unpredictable, and breaking curfew can mean arrest. So Srinagar tends to empty out after dark; some shopkeepers who used to keep late hours have simply given up, pulling down shutters before 8 p.m.

Talking the Talk
The terms of any likely deal between India and Pakistan are widely known. Earlier negotiations, including so-called "back channel" talks between unofficial representatives of India's Singh and Pakistan's former President, Pervez Musharraf, had moved the two countries toward soft borders, free trade and some kind of joint governance of Kashmir. "Nothing more needs to be done," says Sardar Qayyum Khan, former Prime Minister of Pakistani Kashmir. I heard repeatedly from Kashmiris that an end to the political uncertainty is more important than the details of any proposal. "Anything," says Yasser Kazmi, founder of Myasa Network Solutions, one of Kashmir's oldest IT firms. "Any solution that is acceptable to the people of Kashmir."

Reaching a solution will require overcoming 60 years of deeply entrenched positions held by India's political and security establishment, for whom Kashmir has always been the defining foreign policy issue. Ever since a 1948 U.N. resolution calling for a plebiscite on Kashmir's future — a move categorically rejected by India — any concession is read as an affront to national pride. Pakistan, too, will have to move past decades of mistrust of its larger, better-armed neighbor. The Mumbai terror attacks proved that Pakistan has not let go of its longstanding policy of supporting jihadist groups to destabilize India. Under months of intense international pressure, Pakistani authorities twice detained Hafiz Saeed, an LeT founder who now leads another banned organization, but released him on Oct. 12 citing lack of evidence. Several other suspected top LeT commanders were arrested last December, but none of them have so far been prosecuted. "Without the progress on Mumbai, I don't see very much being possible," says Radha Kumar, director of the Nelson Mandela Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution at Jamia Millia Islamia University in New Delhi.

While there has been no large-scale attack in Indian Kashmir since last November, Indian authorities say that the number of suspected militants trying to cross over from Pakistan has increased noticeably since last year. In late March, Indian troops fought a five-day gun battle in the border district of Kupwara. Eight Indian commandos were killed, as well as 25 suspected LeT militants, but others are assumed to have entered successfully. By late summer, violent attacks returned to the heart of Srinagar after a respite of nearly three years. On Aug. 1, two men from the Central Reserve Police Forces (CRPF) were shot, point blank, in the busy Regal Chowk area. On Aug. 31, two more CRPF men were shot in Lal Chowk in an almost identical attack, this time coordinated with a grenade tossed at the Srinagar police chief's office nearby. September witnessed a further escalation. A Sept. 12 car bomb killed four policemen outside the Srinagar Central Jail; 10 days later, security forces say they killed two suspected terrorists, including a commander of Hizb-ul-Mujahedin, a group based in Pakistani Kashmir. On Sept. 28, CRPF killed three militants; a day later, three CRPF men were gunned down in a market in the town of Sopore.

It could get worse. I ask the young men why they persist if, as they say, the police fire at the known stone throwers first. Most laugh off the question with bravado. But Baig is darkly serious. He will keep throwing stones, he says, "until death." If there is another future for him in Kashmir, the time for it is running out.

— with reporting by S. Hussain / New Delhi, Yusuf Jameel / Srinagar And Ershad Mahmud / Islamabad

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September 13, 2009 Extending wings

PML-N's decision to form a chapter in Azad Kashmir might further marginalise the political space of Kashmiris

Azad Kashmir looks ready to host Pakistan Muslim League-N in its political landscape. A series of public and backchannel manoeuvres are being launched by PML-N and its promising local allies to form its chapter in Azad Kashmir. Two parties have reportedly decided to merge in PML-N -- the splinter group of Muslim Conference, commonly known as forward block, led by Raja Farooq Hayder and People Muslim League led by president Barrister Sultan Mahmood Chaudhry.
PML-N chairman, Mian Nawaz Sharif, is reported to have held meetings with several socio-political stakeholders in the region to evaluate different aspects of this initiative before formally announcing it. On the other hand, PML-N spokesman Siddiqul Farooq holds that the decision has already been made by the high command but its announcement is yet to be made. Senator Raja Zafar ul Haq heads the committee which will make detailed presentation before the party's Central Executive Council in the next few weeks.
Sources close to Nawaz Sharif reveal that the top leadership of the party is weighing the options of how to start the initiative. Some members of the party like Raja Zafar ul Haq, Zafar Iqbal Jhagra and Siddiqul Farooq are for establishing the party's branch in AJK. Khawaja Saad Rafique and Khurram Dastgir Khan, however, do not support the decision. Chaudhry Nisar Ali is reportedly undecided in the matter so far.
Nawaz Sharif's decision to extend his party up to Azad Kashmir is questionable especially since the people of Kashmir have no role in Pakistan's domestic politics. Due to the disputed nature of the region, AJK has a separate constitution and governance system. They do not elect representatives for the National Assembly or Senate. No wonder, mainstream parties in Pakistan hardly show any interest in AJK's local politics.
In the mid 1970s, the then prime minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, had established People's Party in Azad Kashmir in the backdrop of Simla agreement wherein both Indira Ghandi and Bhutto agreed to solve the Kashmir issue by maintaining status quo. He failed to persuade the local stakeholders to accept province-like status.
Historically, Muslim League has always supported Muslim Conference in AJK politics but when Nawaz Sharif was overthrown by Pervez Musharraf, this changed -- Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan and his son Sardar Attique wasted no time and joined the Musharraf camp. They were rewarded by Musharraf in 2006 state assembly elections when Attique was made PM. During the Lawyers' Movement, Sardar Attique remained a staunch supporter of Musharraf.
When Musharraf was compelled to quit presidency, anti-Attique lobby within the Muslim Conference got an opportunity to dislodge him, just eight months ago. The breakaway faction of Muslim Conference led coalition government comprises People's Party, People Muslim League and MQM. People's Party engineered another split into forward block and made Friends Group within few weeks after the government formation. This sent shock waves into a Muslim Conference's Farooq Hayder camp and ignited intense power struggle within the coalition government which badly affected the government working. Farooq Hadyer group believes that People's Party can sweep upcoming state elections if a broad-based platform is not established to pitch tough resistance against it.
Barrister Sultan Mahmood Chaudhry has long been trying to obtain Nawaz Sharif's support. He left People's Party in 2006 and formed his own People Muslim League expecting support from Chaudhrys of Gujrat. They ditched him at the eleventh hour since establishment had already made Sardar Attique as their prime choice. His nascent party managed to secure only three assembly seats out of 49.
Sultan Mahmood's second choice was Nawaz Sharif to whom he extended full support. Mahmood maintains good socio-political connections in Britain where over half a million people are from Azad Kashmir, mostly from Mirpur division, settled. His wealthy Jatt clan too extended wholehearted support to Barrister Sultan during his long innings in politics without questioning his ideological commitment. Sultan Mahmood made available huge logistic and human resource to PML-N in London when Nawaz Sharif was running anti-Musharraf campaign in exile.
Lord Nazir Ahamd, who is from Mirpur, and a member of House of Lords, has consistently been taking interest not only in Pakistani but also in AJK politics. He, too, became close ally of democratic leadership of Pakistan, particularly Nawaz Sharif. He also backs Sultan Mahmood to get top position in AJK politics. On Lord Nazir's invitation, Nawaz Sharif is going to Mirpur in the first week of October to address a public gathering where he is expected to announce the formation of PML-N.
AJK elections are due in 2011 but the possibility of midterm elections cannot be ruled out due to the fragile working relationship among coalition partners. Political settings in Islamabad have always had enormous impact on AJK elections or set the voting trend. Usually AJK voters follow Islamabad and Punjab's pattern. The southern part of today's AJK is closely knit with the bordering districts of Punjab particularly with Jhelum, Gujrat and Sailkot.
On both sides, the same Jatt cast is settled. On the other hand, central parts of AJK, Poonch division and Muzaffarabad, maintain close ties with the Rawalpindi division and always prefer to develop economic and social bonds in and around Rawalpindi region, due to its geographic proximity. Besides Kashmiri refugees, a huge number of locals, too, relocated their families to Rawalpindi to avail the city's facilities such as education and healthcare. Nine out of 12 refugee seats are also located in Punjab.
In Punjab, PML-N is not only the ruling party but also has a popularity base which would expectedly reflect into AJK's refugees seats provided Muslim League shows interest. If Nawaz Sharif seriously forms PML-N in AJK, it can emerge as a major political contestant within months, says Tariq Naqash, a senior journalist based in Muzaffarabad.
There is some tough opposition in Azad Kahmir and Pakistan to PML-N's decision. A professor at National Defence University Islamabad puts his views in a very interesting way. On the condition of anonymity he states: "It would be the last nail in the coffin of AJK autonomy and the second step would be the breakup of AJK into different pieces to merge them into Rawalpindi and Hazara divisions respectively".
Former prime minister Sardar Attique Ahmad sees this development as "a major departure from the League's historic stand to back Muslim Conference as a regional partner." Chaudhary Latif Abar, Secretary General of Peoples Party's AJK chapter believes it as "an exercise to steal the PPP's turn to rule".
People's Party Azad Kashmir has been caught in a catch 22 position. It is neither satisfied with incumbent PM Sardar Yaqub Khan nor demands for fresh mandate. It fears that in the North of Azad Kashmir, Muslim Conference may give it tough competition while in South, Sultan Mahmood still maintains strong position. Likewise, the Punjab government may not like to give a walkover to PPP in refugees' constituencies situated in the province.
Above all, PPP not only lacks charismatic leadership but its current president Chaudhry Abdul Majid has no potential to run hectic pre-election campaign due to bad health and age factor. In this backdrop, PPP prefers to continue with coalition government instead of pressing for midterm elections. In this grace period PPP would want to put its house in order. However, the fact can't be denied that the party has strong base in different parts of AJK and refugees constituencies. Additionally, anti-incumbency factor can help People's Party, if skillfully exploited, as people have reached to a saturation point to see Muslim Conference-led governments with different name tags in the last eight years.
Establishment has been playing neutral up until now. Mian Nawaz Sharif very clearly mentioned in his meeting with Muslim Conference and People's Muslim League assembly members last week that "those who want to keep open channels with military and intelligence agencies would not have any place in his party," quoted Raja Farooq Hayder. On the other hand, Asif Ali Zardari also maintains strong hold over local party cadre and leadership. It shows that the upcoming AJK election will be a test match between Zardari and Nawaz loyalists which would determine future electoral battles in the rest of the country.
Unfortunately, the era of regional political personalities and parties is about to end. Now, AJK politics will have to follow dictates of Raiwind and Larkana and their space to run local affairs independently will be further marginalised, says Syed Arif Bahar, an expert on AJK affairs. He also believes that PML-N has the potential to positively contribute in regional politics if it introduces new middle class faces. If, however, the same lot overnight becomes Leagues leaders it would be like old wine in a new bottle.

Column on Gilgit Baltistan

Anatomy of Self-rule for Gilgit-Baltistan ACROSS THE LINE BY ERSHAD MAHMUD

A long awaited reform package on Gilgit-Baltistan, recently announced by Prime Minster Syed Yusuf Raza GiLlani, is regarded a significant step towards empowering local people to elect their own representatives to run their affairs. A welcome part of the package is the adoption of historical and original nomenclature of the region ‘Gilgit-Baltistan’ instead of Northern Areas.The package also offers a range of intuitions of governance and accountability both in the legislative and judiciary domains which were not available to the people in the past sixty years. According to the package Gilgit-Baltistan would have its own governor, chief minister, election commission and some other key state bodies to make the region at par with Azad Kashmir. To reduce the role of ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, a Gilgit-Baltistan Council would be formed with equal representation from the region and the National Assembly of Pakistan.The package largely fulfills the longstanding and consistent demand of the people of the region for their rights to participatory democracy and governance. The past governments in Islamabad had simply ignored the people’s aspirations. Unlike Azad Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan was directly ruled by the federal bureaucrats over the last six decades without being held accountable for any of their actions. Consequently, this had generated a sense of deprivation and discontent across the board particularly among the youth who felt let down and humiliated.The strategic location of Gilgit and Baltistan, too, had made citizens sensitive about their uncertain future. It is situated between the two competitive regional powers, China and India. Both the neighbors have been taking deep interest in the internal affairs of Gilgit-Baltistan for different reasons. The Western China has the shortest route through this region to reach Gawader port in the gulf waters. Huge widening and up gradation work is underway on Karakorum high way to develop north-south international trade corridor to link China, Russia and Central Asian state to oil rich Middle East through Gawadar port.India too pins its hopes on the reopening of Skardu-Ladakh route as well as Astore-Srinagar road-traditional Silk route- to have land access up to Central Asian States besides Chinese province of Xinjiang. This has made Gilgit-Baltistan a natural corridor for future trade and tourism between several regional countries.In this context, the reform package has been unveiled well in time and should be appreciated. However, the reforms package does not address some critical issues like it does not envision formation of interim constitution which is key to devise sustainable democratic system of governance. Likewise, it does not offer any mechanism to have access to higher judiciary for remedy says Hafiz ur Rahman, Pakistan Muslim League president for Gilgit-Baltistan.Additionally, the formation of Gilgit-Baltistan Council is not plausible in the context of Kashmir Council. It always drew huge criticism from AJK politicians and civil society. It has been considered as a tool to snip local autonomy and runs almost a parallel government in Azad Kashmir.Therefore, it is appropriate time to restructure the proposed Gilgit-Baltistan Council to make it a constructive body rather a competitive authority. Its current configuration is heavily tilted towards Islamabad while Gilgit appears a weaker party. Certainly, Islamabad and Gilgit both need a coordinating body to streamline the routine matters between the two authorities but not a body to overshadow the Gilgit administration. However, there is widespread skepticism about the absence of limitation on revenue generation authority and rights.Conversely, the reforms package has evoked considerable controversy in the Kashmiri circles on both sides of the line of control. It is seen a step towards an incision of a part of the disputed state, stated Yasin Malik of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front chairman in presence of Azad Kashmir and Hurriyat Conference leadership in Islamabad. His provocative remarks made headlines in the media besides generating passionate debate in Pakistan. Some would see it the maximum that could be done to empower the region within the present ground realities.All political parties in Pakistan lauded this move except the Kashmiri leadership across the line of control. Most probably they were not taken on board before making public the fresh initiative on Gilgit-Baltistan. All major stakeholders, including the ruling coalition partners in AJK, maintain a unanimous position about the region and its future.A number of All Parties Conferences and AJK assembly resolutions clearly declared Gilgit-Baltistan part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Kashmiri politicians fear that the emerging set up may pave the way for the division of Jammu and Kashmir State.Though, Islamabad replicated AJK template but a portfolio of Governor to Minister of Kashmir Affairs, even though interim, is widely criticized. The appointment of governor also raises doubts, widely respected Kashmiri leader Sardar Khalid Ibrahim fears that the reforms package will transform Gilgit-Baltistan into a full-fledged province in the next step.Pakistan’s official policy on the Northern Areas seems confused and uncertain, particularly after 1980. The main reason was the strategic importance of the region and hence a section of the government has always wished that the areas be merged with Pakistan. Ever since November 1947, the interior and foreign ministries have been thinking on these lines particularly about Gilgit Agency.The Interior Ministry argues that the Gilgit Agency had not been under the administrative control of Maharaja of Kashmir. The British held and administered these areas like other political agencies of the tribal areas. Hence, with the British gone, Gilgit Agency gets automatically transferred to Pakistan. And, as the people of the area have themselves opted to join Pakistan, the legal requirement has also been met, a former diplomat confided on the condition of anonymity.Another historic fact is that Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, the first Chief Minister of NWFP, being a Kashmiri and quite active in the Kashmir struggle, had proposed in 1947 that Gilgit Agency should be transferred to Governor NWFP, like any tribal area. Thus with the time the Agency would become part of North West Frontier Province.The Foreign Office did not agree to the proposal at that time. It felt that although it was nominal yet Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir exercised authority over Gilgit. And thus Gilgit was not independent. There was also a possibility of plebiscite under the auspices of United Nations. Then why should the Gilgit Agency’s “vote bank” be lost?The above dilemma still persists, and can be seen in the initiatives of various government organs in their respective spheres. Gilgit Agency is sometimes shown on the survey maps as part of Pakistan while on some other occasions it is clubbed in with the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir.The relationship between Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan has been deemphasized at the very outset. The Ministry of Kashmir Affairs blocked political parties of Azad Kashmir to run their political activities in Gilgit and Baltistan. Late K.H. Khurshid was not allowed entry into Gilgit.The founder president of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim, once said that he was not allowed to visit the region whenever he tried. Such actions by the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs were considered to mean that people of the two areas should not be allowed to forge close relations.In fact, the reforms package is intelligently designed by the government to serve multiple purposes. It does not de-link Gilgit-Baltistan from the broader Kashmir dispute which is a positive development. However, despite the reservations of Kashmiri leaders there is no likelihood that in future Gilgit-Baltistan and AJK can become one unit. This is right time for the government to dispel the apprehensions of Kashmiri leadership. At least, the office of chief minister can be replaced with the chief executive and the portfolio of governor can be abolished.(The writer is Islamabad based analyst. rawalakotjk@gmail.com)

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